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In preparing the Survey of Administrative Law for 1964, we find
only eleven cases upon which to comment. Seven of them arise from
a single field of administrative action, i.e., the work of County Beer
Boards. One is a zoning variation case, another involves a realtor's
license revocation, and the other two are lower federal court cases
decided in Tennessee, one relating to social security, and the other
to an interpretation of the abandonment provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Compared with many other states this is a modest
showing. Indeed, when one takes account of the number of boards
and commissions in Tennessee the number of cases is extraordinarily
small.
The principal administrative agencies in this state with authority
over rule-making and contested cases are the Railroad and Public
Utility Commission,1 the Employee Security Commission,2 the Commissioner of Revenue, 3 the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking,4
the State Aeronautics Commission, 5 the County Beer Boards, 6 and a
host of business and professional licensing agencies such as the Real
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University
1. TENN.CODE ANN.§8 65-201 to -521 (1956).
2. TEEN. CODE ANN.§8 50-1301 to -1358 (1956).
3. TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 67-2501 to -3510 (1956).
4. TEN. CODE ANN.§§ 56-101 to -140 (1956).
5. Trm. CODE ANN.§§ 42-201 to -242 (1956).
6. TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 57-201 to -221 (1956).
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Estate Commission,7 the Medical Examiners Board,8 the Pharmacy
Board,9 the Dental Examiners Board, 0 and the Barbers Board."
Possibly the small number of cases reaching the courts from these
agencies reflects a high measure of satisfaction with the administrative process in Tennessee. Or possibly it indicates that the procedures
available at the administrative level and for court review of administrative decisions are not calculated to facilitate presentation and
examination of the issues, and hence private interests are not as well
served as they should be. With this preliminary observation we
proceed to examine the eleven cases.
I. CouNTY BEER BOARD CASES

Under the Tennessee Code 12 one who wishes to sell beer or light
alcoholic beverages within the county outside city limits must apply
to the county court or to a committee appointed by that court for a
permit to do so. Within cities he must apply to boards created by
ordinance. The applicant must establish that he and his employees
are United States citizens; that sales will not cause congestion of
traffic or interfere with schools, churches and places of public gathering, or with public health, safety or morals; that no sales will be
made to minors; and that neither the applicant nor any of his
employees have been convicted of violation of liquor laws or a
crime involving moral turpitude within the last ten years. Any
outstanding permit may be revoked for violation of the laws. Provision is made for court review of either an order of revocation or
an order granting or refusing to grant a permit by petition for a
statutory writ of certiorarito be followed by a trial de novo in either13
the circuit or the chancery court with appeal to the supreme court.

Under these statutory provisions seven cases have reached the
supreme court during the year 1964, with the following results:
A. Municipal Home Rule in Beer Licensing Cases
In De Caro v. City of Collierville, 4 the petitioner, whose application

for a permit had been denied by the Beer Board, filed his petition
for statutory certiorari in chancery. The evidence indicated that the
applicant satisfied all of the specific requirements of sections 57-205
7. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1301 to -1328 (1956).
8. T NN. CODE AN. §§ 63-101 to -621 (1956).

9. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-1001 to -1023 (1956).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-501 to -529 (1956).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-301 to -333 (1956).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 57-205, 57-208 (1956).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-209 (1956).
213 Tenn. 254, 373 S.W.2d 466 (1963).

1965 ]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1049

and 208 of the Code as above stated, but also it appeared that the
City of Collierville had adopted an ordinance pursuant to local
option authority given it by statute 15 limiting the number of permits
to be issued within the city to seven. Since there were then seven
permits outstanding, the Board had denied the plaintiff's application.
The chancellor overruled the Board and decided in favor of the
plaintiff on the ground that the limitation of the total number of
permits to seven was invalid, and since the plaintiff had satisfied
the requirements of section 57-205, as amended, the issuance of the
permit was mandatory. There was good argument for the chancellor's
position. It is true that Code section 57-208 provides that cities may,
in connection with issuing beer permits, "impose additional restrictions, fixing zones and territories, and providing hours of opening and
closing, and such other rules and regulations as will promote public
health, morals and safety as they may by ordinance provide." However, Code section 57-205 was amended in 196116 to include a new
provision to the effect that "any applicant seeking a license or permit
under this section and who complies with the conditions and provisions of this section shall have issued to him the necessary license or
permit . . . ." (Emphasis added.) It was not unreasonable for the
chancellor to conclude that this language limited the powers given
to cities by the previously enacted Code section 57-208.
The supreme court, however, reversed the decree of the chancellor.
The court reached the rather significant conclusion that the earlier
provision was not affected by the subsequent amendment of Code
section 57-205, that the municipality continues to possess the right
under Code section 57-208 to impose requirements and limitations in
addition to those prescribed under Code section 57-205, that a
maximum number of permits to be issued can be established by
city ordinance, and that the city can even by ordinance totally prohibit the sale of beer or light alcoholic beverages. 17 In its opinion the
court went on to state that the only limitation on the city or town
is that it must exercise its power in good faith and not in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner. Thus, municipal home rule powers
remain intact in Tennessee so far as the sale of beer and light alcoholic
beverages is concerned.
15. TENN. CODEA. § 57-208 (1956).
16. TmE'z. CoDE ANN. § 57-205 (Supp. 1964).
17. In Ketner v. Clabo, 189 Tenn. 260, 225 S.W.2d 54 (1949), it had been
previously held that the number of permits could be limited under the statutes in force
prior to 1961, and in Grubb v. Morristown, 185 Tenn. 114, 203 S.W.2d 593 (1947),
the court had held that the city might by ordinance totally prohibit the sale of beer
or light alcoholic beverages.
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B. De Novo Review in Beer Permit Cases
In the course of its opinion in the De Caro case the supreme court
referred with approval to the 1962 decision in Fentress County Beer
Board v. Cravens.18 That case is an important one in Tennessee administrative law for the reason that it deals with possible constitutional
limitations upon the power of the courts to review administrative
agency decisions of a legislative or administrative nature. Fentress
is another beer permit case. In view of the fact that the court in the
De Caro case reaffirmed Fentress, the circumstance is worthy of
comment.
By way of background, reference must also be made to two other
Tennessee Supreme Court decisions. One was rendered in 1953 in
0 in
Hoover Motor Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission,"
which the supreme court held that a statute prescribing de novo
review of non-judicial administrative action, e.g., action upon an
application for a certificate of convenience and necessity for a motor
carrier, was contrary to the constitution as a delegation of legislative
or administrative power to the judiciary. The other decision was
handed down in 1961 in City of Whitwell v. Fowler.20 It was a rate
classification case, in which the supreme court for reasons similar
to those in the Hoover case held "ineffective" a provision in Chapter
162 of the Public Acts of 195321 to the effect that in reviewing Railroad and Public Utilities Commission orders the courts might reverse
the commission if its findings are "unsupported by the preponderance
of proof in view of the entire record before the Commission." This
conclusion was said to follow from the fact that the Commission was
exercising 'legislative or administrative" powers in passing upon rate
classification questions and the courts cannot be expected in reviewing such Commission action to assume, by examining the weight of
the evidence, the burdens of another department of the government.
In view of these supreme court decisions what can we now say
concerning the state of the law in Tennessee respecting de novo
review of administrative agency decisions? Possibly one should merely
conclude that the law is in a state of uncertainty. Yet, in view of the
latest in the series of decisions, i.e., De Caro v. City of Collierville,
upholding the trial de novo of an order involving the refusal of a
beer permit, there seems to be some grounds for concluding that
the Tennessee Supreme Court is moving away from the Hoover
Motor Co. decision, and is opening the door to plenary review
18. 209 Tenn. 679, 356 S.W.2d 260 (1962). The Fentress case is carefully discussed
by Sanford, Administrative Law-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REV. 623 (1963).
19. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
20. 208 Tenn. 80, 343 S.W.2d 897 (1961).
21. TENN. CODE ANN, §§ 65-201 to -232 (1956).
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of the facts in administrative agency cases even in characteristically
legislative or administrative matters. This conclusion is subject, no
doubt, to the qualification that in such review proceedings the court
will not go so far as to review the exercise of discretionary authority
properly conferred upon administrative agencies and exercised by
such agencies in good faith. Whether or not such broad review is
wise may be open to some question, but at least it does not seem to
be unconstitutional under the most recent supreme court decisions.
The remaining six of the 1964 Beer Board permit decisions covered
by this survey bear out the above conclusion, not so much from the
language of the supreme court in the respective opinions as from the
action of the court in sustaining the chancellor's review of the merits
of the several cases. These six cases are Cantrell v. DeKalb County
Beer Board,2 (Board refused permit, chancellor reversed Board and
ordered the permit issued, supreme court affirmed lower court),
Hughes v. Little, Chairman, Carter County Beer Board, (Board
refused permit, chancellor affirmed, supreme court affirmed lower
court), Chadwick v. Beer Committee of Anderson CountyA (Board
refused permit, chancellor reversed Board and ordered the permit
issued, supreme court affirmed lower court), Case v. Carney,25 (Board
refused permit, chancellor affirmed Board, supreme court reversed and
remanded the case because lower court did not properly "weigh the
evidence"), Adams v. Monroe County Quarterly Court,26 (Board
refused permit, chancellor reversed the Board and ordered the permit
issued, the supreme court affirmed the lower court), and Moore v.
Marshall County Beer Board,27 (Board refused permit, chancellor
reversed the Board and ordered the permit issued, the supreme court
affirmed the lower court). It will be noted that in four of the cases,
Cantrell, Chadwick, Adams, and Moore, the chancellor in a trial
de novo reviewed the Beer Board's denial of the permits on the merits
and ordered them to be issued. Moreover, in Cantrell, Chadwick, and
Adams the supreme court itself scrutinized the merits of the chancellor's decisions both on law and facts. In other words both the
chancellor and the supreme court on a de novo review play a large
role in the process of granting or refusing beer permits. Undoubtedly,
such action should be classified as "administrative" at the agency
level, and yet, a plenary judicial review is acceptable under Tennessee constitutional principles. Taken together these six cases and the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

213
213
376
213
379

Tenn. 568, 376 S.W.2d 480 (1964).
Tenn. 574, 376 S.W.2d 482 (1964).
S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. 1964).
Tenn. 592, 376 S.W.2d 492 (1964).
S.W.2d 769 (Tenn. 1964).

27. 383 S.W.2d 14 (Tenn. 1964).
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De Caro case seem to constitute a clear indication that the 1953
Hoover Motor Co. case can no longer be accepted at its full face
value.
Additionally, in the Cantrell opinion the supreme court was more
than explicit when it said "the trial judge is required to make an
independent judgment on the merits which . . . results in the trial
judge substituting his judgment for that of the beer board; but . . .
the courts cannot escape this responsibility,unwelcome though it may
be, when the statute commands it."28 Moreover, as the court points
out, after the decision by the trial court, if the parties are not satisfied, an appeal may then be taken to the supreme court where, "under
Code section 27-303 the hearing is again de novo, although it is
accompanied by a presumption of correctness, and the trial court's
judgment will stand unless the evidence preponderates against it."
Thus, we have independent review of the entire case in the trial
court plus full authority to review subject to a self-restraining presumption, in the supreme court.
These cases rather definitely establish the law to be applied in beer
permit cases. Is there any good reason why the same principles
concerning the constitutional acceptability of plenary review would
not be equally applicable in other areas of administrative agency
action? There is, indeed, no good reason for differentiation between
the various areas of action. Yet, this still leaves to be determined
the question of desirability of such broad review. As a matter of
policy should the trial court and the supreme court be required by
legislative enactment to undertake an independent judicial review of
fact questions (and possibly discretionary matters) arising in administrative procedings? Or would it be a wiser use of available
judicial and official skills to place responsibility for such determinations upon the presumably competent administrators who have the
primary responsibility, the presumed technical knowledge, and the
first hand contact with the factual situations? Such decisions can and
should remain subject to review for arbitrary, capricious or illegal
action, and in some situations even for clear error on the facts, but to
broaden the review further can only be deemed questionable policy
and an unwarranted burden on the courts.
II.

IEVOCATION OF REALTORS LICENSES

The revocation of a license to do business normally involves
28. (Emphasis added.) The responsibility resting upon the chancellor to review
de novo was strongly re-affimed in Case v. Carney, 213 Tenn. 592, 376 S.W.2d 492
(1964), one of the six 1964 beer permit cases, in which the chancellor was reversed
because he did not weigh the evidence.
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consideration of legal grounds for revocation, the examination of
facts bearing upon a possible violation warranting revocation, and
the reaching of the decision. It is a characteristically judicial process,
and it can involve serious implications for the licensee. Under the
Tennessee statutes2 9 real estate broker licenses are issued to qualified
applicants by the Tennessee Real Estate Commission, and elaborate
provisions are made for revocation or suspension under proper circumstances. Code section 62-1324 sets forth ten grounds for revocation,
eight of which are related directly to real estate brokerage transactions, but two of which relate to general qualities of the licensee's
worthiness, competence and honesty.
In Tennessee Real Estate Commission v. Godwin,30 the court was
confronted with the revocation by the Commission of Godwin's real
estate broker's license. He was charged with fraud in connection
with personal real estate transactions, which fraud was involved and
proved in collateral judicial proceedings. However, the fraud so
proved did not relate to conduct in the licensee's capacity as a real
estate broker. The Commission revoked the license. The question
was whether or not such charges of collateral fraud could support
the revocation. The statutes31 authorize the Commission to revoke
or suspend the license if the licensee is found guilty, among other
offenses, of:
(h) Being unworthy or incompetent to act as a real estate broker or
salesman in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public.
(i) Any other conduct ....

dishonest dealing.

which constitutes improper, fraudulent, or

On certiorari,the chancellor concluded that since the fraudulent
acts performed by Godwin were not related to his activities as a
broker, the Commission was without power to revoke on such
grounds. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the chancellor
holding that the general provisions, (h) and (i) above quoted,
warranted the Commission's action. Said the court:
We think it would be an anomaly to so construe the act as to render
the Tennessee Real Estate Commission powerless to act to rid the ranks
of real estate agents and brokers of men who have been convicted of
fraudulent transactions whether directly in pursuit of the licensed privilege
or not ....

We do not think this result was intended by the legislature.

...

Not only was the court's interpretation commendable from the
standpoint of public policy, but it accords with conclusions reached
29. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1301 to -1328 (1956).
30. 378 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1964).
31. TmN. CODE ANN. § 62-1324 (1956).
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in similar revocation proceedings by the courts of both New Jersey12
and Florida.33 Moreover, the decision clarifies the substantive powers
of the Tennessee Real Estate Commission and, thus, strengthens
administrative law in this state in a fairly significant particular.
III. ZONING DCiSIONS

Zoning decisions are almost exclusively the function of local government; yet in a larger sense they are an important part of the
administrative law of the state. In fact, the same principles and
procedures should be applicable whatever level of government is
involved.
Reddoch v. Smith was a zoning case. A property owner by the
name of Murray sought a zoning variation requesting the Shelby
County Board of Adjustment to permit the erection of a gasoline
filling station on a certain corner in Shelby County outside the city
limits. The Board granted the variation, changing the classification
from R-1' residential to commercial. A petition for common law
certiorariwas filed in the circuit court by nearby property owners.
That court affirmed the Board, finding, among other things, that "the
evidence did not preponderate against the findings" of the Board.
Appeal was taken to the supreme court. That court noted that the
Board acted as a quasi-judicial body. "Its decision becomes final on
the facts

. .

." It can act to authorize variations, in the words of the

ordinance, "where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of the [zoning]
regulations . . ." In taking such action, said the court, the Board

is "vested with a wide discretion, and the courts will not interfere
with that discretion unless it is abused." It is the court's duty "to
determine... whether the [Board] has acted beyond its jurisdiction,
arbitrarily, fraudulently or illegally .

. .

. Whether there is any

material evidence to support the finding and order is a matter of law
for the court upon review."'

Thereupon, the court reviewed the evidence showing that the
property in question had been offered for sale as residential property
du "ng a period of eight years but had attracted no buyer; that it
fri6nted on a heavy traffic street; that it was only 1000 feet from an
expressway and interchange; that there was a restaurant across the
street and a construction business nearby. Altogether, so concluded
32. Real Estate Commn'n v. Ponsi, 39 N.J. Super. 526, 121 A.2d 555 (1956).
33. Anderson v. Fla. Real Estate Comm'n, 105 So. 2d 918 (Fla. App. 1958).
34. 379 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. 1964).
35. Citing Hoover Motor Express v. Railroad and Pub. Util. Comm'n, 195 Tenn.
593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
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the court, there was material evidence to support the variation. 36
The court theii said cogently, "We know, of course, that the men who
composed this Board, heard this evidence, and viewed the property,
were substantial citizens and were in a far better position to know
and determine under the facts presented to them whether or not this
variation should be granted than is the court . . . ." The judgment
of the trial court affirming the Board's decision was affirmed.
This conclusion together with the supporting arguments can be
commended as a proper and sensible working of the administrative
process, i.e., leaving the decision on the facts to the body best qualified to make it. It contrasts favorably with the Beer Board cases
and their statutory de novo review.

IV. FEDERAL ADnDwT-Aii

vE LAw CAsEs

Although federal cases do not necessarily make state administrative
law, Tennessee federal court decisions are a part of the total administrative process within the state's borders and, accordingly, Tennessee
readers may find interesting two recent decisions of the federal district
courts sitting in this state.
A. The Social Security Act
In Holland v. Celebrezze,37 the plaintiff, age 72, was an applicant
for social security benefits. She attempted to qualify under an
arrangement pursuant to which her brother, a widower, as a result
of a divorce decree, employed her to keep his daughter in plaintiff's
home, feeding, disciplining and sending her to school, as well as
taking care of her clothes and other needs. The father visited his
daughter on weekends and "supervised" the wardrobe, recreation,
and school and extra-curricular activities of the child, as well as her
deportment, health and diet. For such services the plaintiff was paid
by her brother fifty dollars per calendar quarter for an aggregate of
six calendar quarters. She then claimed old age insurance benefits.
The administrative determination in the bureau in the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare was adverse to the plaintiff,
holding that she was not in the "domestic service" of her brother, as
required by the Social Security Act.3 Her claim for benefits was
denied. This decision was appealed to a hearing examiner who
affirmed the departmental decision. Judicial review was sought under
36. A large number of variations of cases involving factual decisions may be found
collected and analyzed in Annot., 168 A.L.R. 131-156 (1947) and Annot., 75 A.L.R.
2d 168-311 (1961).
37. 223 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
38. 49 Stat. 625 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 409(g)(2) (1958).
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the act which provides that "the findings of the Secretary as to facts
are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence." The federal
district court reversed the secretary's decision, holding that the required employer-employee relationship existed for the mandatory
period and that it should be deemed to have produced the necessa y
wage credits to entitle the plaintiff to benefits.
The federal court tpok its action notwithstanding the formula
making the agency decision final if "supported by substantial evidence." The court decided that on the above stated facts there was a
good faith employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff
and her brother. Noting that the Social Security Act39 prescribes
that any person who under the "common law rules" would have the
status of an employee would qualify, the court took account of the
usual elements, that is direction and control by the employer, the
services rendered by the employee, and the payment of compensation
by the employer for the services. The court concluded that they
were decisive of the issue. The plaintiff was, in effect, a governess.
Interestingly enough the court cited Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB,4 in support of the assumption by the federal courts of greater
"responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of decisions of
federal agencies than some courts have demonstrated in the past."
Said the court, "We are not disposed to abdicate the conventional
judicial function in these matters." In effect the court held, without
actually so stating, that the determination of employment status under
common law rules is a question of law for the court. 4 ' Actually the
determination of employment status under the various federal acts
is not easy, nor is the court's power to reverse the administrative
finding on the question at all clear. There have, in fact, been many
social security cases in which the courts have accepted the Secretary's
conclusions.42
B. Interstate Commerce Commission-Jurisdictionover
Abandonment Cases
This exceedingly complex area of administrative action was presented to the Court in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Memphis
39. 49 Stat. 625 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 410(j)(2) (1958).
40, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
41. Compare NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944), in which
the court held that the Board's decision to the effect that semi-independent newsboys
were "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act should be sustained since
it had "warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law."
42. See, e.g., Palmer v. Celebrezze, 334 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1964); Johnson v.
Fleming, 264 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1959); Folsom v. O'Neal, 250 F.2d 946 (10th Cir.
1957).
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Union Station Co.43 In this case the Commission brought action
against The Union Station Company and four railroad companies
that had been using the station to prevent the termination of such
use and the transfer of their railroad termini in Memphis to other
quarters without first obtaining a certificate of public convenience
and necessity from the Commission. Such certificate is required by
Section 1(18) of the Interstate Commerce Act4 for any "abandonment
of all or any portion of a line of railroad." The Commission contended that the station and the tracks leading to it were parts of a
"line of railroad" and, therefore, a certificate was required. On the
other hand, the defendants asserted that a certificate was not needed
since the approaches to the Union Station were in reality "spur or
switching tracks" exempted from the certificate requirement by Section 1(22) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Weight was added to
the defendants' argument by the fact that passenger trains did not
approach the station directly on through tracks, but were backed into
the station on Y shaped approach tracks connected with the main lines.
The defendant further contended that the station itself should not be
deemed to be a "line of railroad." In addition to the abandonment
issue, the Commission contended that the acquisition by the railroad
defendants of other terminal facilities in Memphis constituted an
"acquisition of trackage and facilities" without the certificate required
by section 5(2) of the act. The central issue was really one of jurisdiction of the Commission under the facts of the case. The court,
after considering the technical interpretation of sections 1(18),
1(22) and 5(2) as well as taking account of the possible effect on the
public of the proposed abandonments and acquisitions, concluded that
"line of railroad" and not mere "spur or switching tracks" were
involved, and the Interstate Commerce Commission had jurisdiction
over the operations. An injunction was issued.
Only a fraction of the substantive complexities of the case are
revealed by the foregoing brief resume. The court's opinion, however,
invites a comment concerning the technical difficulties frequently
encountered on the substantive side of administrative law. What are
to be deemed "spur tracks," for example, arises again and again under
widely varying circumstances. There is much to be said for so
limiting the scope of judicial review as to take reasonable advantage
of the technical experience, familiarity and skill of properly qualified
administrators. At the same time the burden of de novo review
should not be placed on the courts. Good government is best served
by a proper distribution of functions. This principle would be a
43. 230 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).
44. 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1958).
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useful guide in Tennessee in shaping the administrative law of this
state. Again the Beer Board cases stand out in sharp contrast.
V. A PnoposED TENNESSEE ADmISTRATrVE PNocED=U AcT
Doubtless the most significant development of the year from a long
range point of view in the field of administrative law in Tennessee
has been the excellent progress in the preparation of a draft State
Administrative Procedure Act for presentation to the Legislature.
In 1963, the Legislature created a Law Revision Commission charged,
among other things, with the duty of proposing specific reforms in the
4
organization of administrative agencies and their rules of procedure.
By way of guidance the Commission has made use of the Revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act promulgated in 1961 by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
This act has been used widely throughout the country by state
legislatures interested in preparing comprehensive state administrative procedure legislation for their respective states40 To make
available for its deliberations the essential background research the
Law Revision Commission was fortunately able to enlist the services
of Professor Daniel J. Gifford of the Vanderbilt Law Faculty. He has
prepared a comprehensive and penetrating 160 page monograph
treating, with special reference to Tennessee law, all of the significant
phases of the subject, including rule making, the procedures in contested cases and the manner and extent of judicial review. 47 It is to be
hoped that the Law Revision Commission draft will be ready for
introduction in the 1967 legislative session.
For over thirty years an enormous amount of high level attention
has been devoted to both state and federal administrative procedure.
In 1941, the United States Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure presented its final report, and five years later in
1946 the federal Administrative Procedure Act became law.48 Con45. Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 74 (1963).
46. For the text of the Revised Act, see 1961 HANDBOOK OF =-E NATIONAL CONFImENCE OF Co nrssloNEls ON UNwOamr STATE LAWS 206-23. The model act has either

been adopted or used as a guide in the preparation of administrative procedure
legislation in the following states: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. For a
first rate general discussion written by Professor Maurice Merill of the University of
Oklahoma Law Faculty at the time of the adoption of the Oklahoma Administrative
Procedure Act, see 17 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1964). Professor Merrill assisted the Oklahoma
Legislature in drafting its act.
47. It is hoped that this monograph can be published in the Vanderbilt Law Review
in the near future.
48. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
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currently, the Uniform Laws Commissioners worked on a Model

State Administrative Procedure Act, and this also was finally promulgated in 1946.49 After ten years of experience at both federal and

state levels the Commissioners prepared the Revised Model State Act
which is now being widely used.
There can be little doubt that the administrative procedure legislation which has resulted from these activities has made a vast
improvement in the administrative systems of the country. The major
principles embraced in the model acts include such fundamental
matters as the requirement that each agency adopt essential procedural
as well as substantive rules; that all rule making be accompanied by
proper notice and opportunity to submit views; that there be proper
assurance of publicity for all administrative rules; that provision be
made for declaratory judgments and rulings; that there be assurance
of fundamental fairness in administrative hearings-particularly as to
notice, rules of evidence, taking official notice, separation of functions,
and the assurance of personal familiarity with the evidence on the
part of responsible deciding officers; and, finally, that provision be
made for wise and adequate judicial review. These are basic principles
of fairness in procedure. Tennessee will have a better system when
its legislature adopts some such law for this state.
49. See 1946

PROCEEDINGS oF THE

NCCUSL 202-17.

